Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe post‐global financial crisis world will be increasingly dominated by China and the United States. What the de facto G2 do, together, independently or in conflict, will increasingly define the global bounds of the possible. Both countries want to embed their bilateral diplomacy in the multilateralism of the G20. The problem for the emergent G2 in G20 global architecture is that economic relations between China and the US will be increasingly difficult to manage. The large economic imbalances between the two countries, in which China buys American debt and Americans buy Chinese goods, will endure. Before the crisis, the codependence these imbalances created was a source of stability in Sino–American relations. After the crisis, they will be a source of frustration and conflict, as the second half of 2009 showed. To manage economic relations between China and the US effectively, the G20 agenda will have to move from crisis management to strategic planning for the global economy. The G20 will also have to become more institutionalized, but in a way that resembles more a nonexecutive board of directors of a multinational firm than a management committee of C‐level executives.Policy Implications

 The world will be characterized by a de facto China–US G2 after the financial crisis.
 Despite new commitments from both countries, large‐scale China–US economic imbalances will persist.
 Dueling protectionism and economic nationalism are the biggest potential medium‐term threats to China–US relations.
 Nesting the de facto G2 in the de jure G20 is the best hope for managing China–US tensions.
 The G20 should be institutionalized as the board of directors for overseeing the Bretton Woods system, not as a replacement for it.

One of the most significant developments of the second half of the 20th century has been the spread of liberal economic and political ideas, institutions, and policies across a large part of the globe.

This article explores the two main positions regarding the globalization & national autonomy debate on the effects of globalization of markets for goods, services, & capital on national economic policy choices. The efficiency hypothesis highlights competitiveness pressure & threats of exit by mobile asset holders, whereas the compensation hypothesis emphasizes the domestic dislocations generated by globalization & the incentives for government interventions in the economy that these generate. Using tables & figures, the author presents major findings with respect to government spending patterns in more than a hundred countries from 1970-1995. The author concludes that there are differences in opinion between the views held by politicians & academic work regarding the effects of globalization on national economic policy. 4 Tables, 2 Figures, 35 References. E. Sanchez

The most important causes of globalization differ among the three major components of international market integration: trade, multinational production, and international finance. The information technology revolution has made it very difficult for governments to control cross-border capital movements, even if they have political incentives to do so. Governments can still restrict the multinationalization of production, but they have increasingly chosen to liberalize because of the macroeconomic benefits. Although the one-time Ricardian gains from freer trade are clear, whether trade is good for growth in the medium term is less certain. In the case of trade, the increasing interest of exporters in opening up domestic markets has had a powerful impact on the trend to liberalization. Cross-national variations in market integration still endure, but these are more the product of basic economic characteristics (such as country size and level of development) than political factors (such as regime type or the left-right balance of power).

The most important causes of globalization differ among the three major components of international market integration: trade, multinational production, & international finance. The information technology revolution has made it very difficult for governments to control cross-border capital movements, even if they have political incentives to do so. Governments can still restrict the multinationalization of production, but they have increasingly chosen to liberalize because of the macroeconomic benefits. Although the one-time Ricardian gains from freer trade are clear, whether trade is good for growth in the medium term is less certain. In the case of trade, the increasing interest of exporters in opening up domestic markets has had a powerful impact on the trend to liberalization. Cross-national variations in market integration still endure, but these are more the product of basic economic characteristics (such as country size & level of development) than political factors (such as regime type or the left-right balance of power). 3 Tables, 4 Figures, 1 Appendix, 100 References. Adapted from the source document.

Replies to Colin Hay's comments (2000) on Garrett's 1998 book, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy, which claims that social democracy continues to be both distinctive & successful in cases where powerful left-of-center parties are allied with strong & centralized trade union movements. Hay asks whether this means that countries without entrenched corporatist institutions must give in to global market forces by shrinking state activism. Here, scant evidence is found for the claim that the international integration of financial markets has been associated with a reduction in fiscal activism in the Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development (OECD) countries. This is consistent with Garrett's partisan mediation thesis. An effort is made to take up Hay's challenge of analyzing policy developments without recourse to Garret's institutional typology. It is shown that fiscal policy in the OECD had been considerably more restrictive where governments have committed to fixed exchange rates. It is argued that European countries have nonetheless chosen to fix their exchange rates as part of the broader regional integration project. It is suggested that the Eurozone may well not be dominated by conservative fiscal policies. The European Central Bank is unlikely to be as conservative as the Budesbank & the political & economic incentives for fiscal prudence in the Eurozone are weaker than under the European Monetary System. 4 Tables, 1 Figure, 15 References. Adapted from the source document.